

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-11 AF-10 ARA-16 CIAE-00 DODE-00

EA-11 EUR-25 PM-07 H-03 INR-11 IO-14 L-03 NASA-04

NEA-14 NSAE-00 NSC-07 OIC-04 SP-03 PA-04 PRS-01

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INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

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DISTO

E.O. 11652: NA

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: CCD: 647TH PLENARY MEETING, JULY 30, 1974

1. SUMMARY: SCHEDULED SPEAKERS AT JULY 30 PLENARY MEETING WERE SWEDEN AND USSR. SWEDISH STATEMENT COVERED NON-PROLIFERATION, "MINI-NUKES", SALT, THRESHOLD TEST BAN, PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, AND NPT SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM. SOVIET STATEMENT DEALT EXCLUSIVELY WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND WAS ESSENTIALLY REITERATION OF VIEWS EXPRESSED BY SOVIET EXPERT IN INFORMAL CW MEETINGS. INDIAN REP, EXERCISING RIGHT OF REPLY, INDICATED HE COULD NOT ACCEPT SWEDISH PERSPECTIVE ON PNE'S. END SUMMARY.

2. UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE THORSSON (SWEDEN) STATED THAT NUCLEAR TESTS BY SIX COUNTRIES IN LAST THREE MONTHS HAD CREATED INCREASED PROLIFERATION RISKS AND CALLED FOR COMPLETE CESSATION OF TESTING BY SUPERPOWERS AND ADHERENCE TO LTBT BY STATES STILL TESTING IN ATMOSPHERE. TAKING NOTE OF ASSURANCES BY INDIAN GOVERNMENT THAT ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS INTENDED SOLELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, THORSSON SAID THAT ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSION BY A NEW COUNTRY NEVERTHELESS SHARPLY INCREASED RISK OF FURTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION. SHE STATED THAT NPT WAS BY NATURE DISCRIMINATORY BUT THAT IT WAS IN INTEREST OF EVERY SINGLE COUNTRY THAT ITS PURPOSE BE FULFILLED. SHE ASSERTED THAT SWEDEN'S ADHERENCE TO NPT WAS FIRM AND THAT THERE WAS NO TEMPTATION FOR SWEDEN TO FOLLOW INDIAN LEAD.

3. "MINI-NUKES". MRS. THORSSON EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO UK AND US FOR REPLYING TO SWEDISH QUESTIONS ON "MINI-NUKES" POSED LAST YEAR TO NUCLEAR POWERS IN COMMITTEE. SHE WAS PARTICULARLY AHPPY TO NOTE EXPLICIT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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US STATEMENT AT MAY 23 PLENARY THAT IT HAD NO INTENTION TO TREAT SUCH TACTICAL SYSTEMS AS INTERCHANGEABLE WITH CONVENTIONAL ARMS OR TO ERODE FIREBREAK BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR ARMS. SHE WAS ALSO PLEASED TO HEAR UNEQUIVOCAL US ANSWERS TO SWEDISH QUESTIONS. POSITIONS TAKEN ISSUE BY UK AND US WERE REASSURING AND SHOULD REMOVE ONE OF THE POTENTIAL DANGERS TO NPT REGIME. THORSSON HOPED SIMILAR STATEMENT WOULD BE MADE BY USSR.

THIS, SHE SAID, WOULD ENABLE CCD TO CLOSE ISSUE.

4. SALT. THORSSON WELCOMED SUMMIT AGREEMENT ON ABM SYSTEMS, BUT SAID THAT CONTINUING STATEMENT REGARDING CENTRAL ISSUE OF OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS GAVE RISE TO MISGIVINGS WITH RESPECT TO PROSPECTS FOR CONTAINING ACCELERATED ARMS RACE. IN ORDER TO ENABLE PARTIES AND NON-PARTIES TO NPT TO ASSESS PROGRESS BY SUPERPOWERS IN PURSUIT OF ARTICLE VI OF TREATY, IT WAS DESIRABLE FOR THEM TO HAVE OFFICIAL ACCESS TO ALL RELEVANT TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS IN FIELD. SINCE IT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE TWO POWERS TO MAKE AVAILABLE MATERIAL WHICH SPOKE IN THEIR FAVOR, SWEDISH DEL COULD NOT UNDERSTAND DECISION TO KEEP "TEXT OF PROTOCOL REGARDING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS "SECRET".

5. THRESHOLD TEST BAN. THORSSON SAID SWEDISH DEL COULD FORESEE, AT MOST, MODERATE DECREASE IN FREQUENCY OF US AND SOVIET TESTS ONCE TTB CAME INTO FORCE. UNFORTUNATELY, BEFORE EFFECTIVE DATE, INCREASE IN NUMBER OF TESTS ABOVE 150 KILOTONS COULD BE EXPECTED. SHE ASSERTED THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FIELD OF PRECISION GUIDANCE HAD REDUCED NEED FOR POWERFUL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE HIGHLY ACCURATE SYSTEMS WITH LOWER YIELD WARHEADS COULD TAKE PLACE OF LESS ACCURATE SYSTEMS WITH MORE POWERFUL EXPLOSIVES. THIS, SHE SAID, APPEARED TO BE TECHNICAL REASON BEHIND THRESHOLD TEST BAN. SHE ALSO MAINTAINED THAT, FROM VIEWPOINT OF IDENTIFICATION, THRESHOLD COULD HAVE BEEN SET CONSIDERABLY LOWER THAN 150 KILOTONS AND THEREFORE HELD THAT THERE MUST BE SOME OTHER EXPLANATION THAN VERIFICATION ISSUE FOR SELECTION OF "VERY HIGH THRESHOLD". SHE HOPED THAT TTB WOULD MAKE CTB EASIER TO OBTAIN, BUT FELT THAT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ARGUMENTS COULD BE MADE ON EITHER SIDE. ON ONE HAND, IT COULD BE FEARED THAT PARTIES WILL REGARD TTB AS CONVENIENT CLOSURE OF TEST BAN ISSUE. ON OTHER HAND, DETAILED COOPERATION ON VERIFICATION COULD WELL GENERATE ENOUGH UNDERSTANDING AND TRUST SO THAT CONTROL ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO CTB COULD BE SET ASIDE.

6. WITH RESPECT TO BILATERAL NATURE OF TREATY, MRS. THORSSON STATED THAT REST OF WORLD CANNOT BE LEFT OUTSIDE COURSE OF EVENTS AND CCD MEMBERS MUST THEREFORE CONTINUOUSLY STUDY HOW BILATERAL AGREEMENT AFFECTS ALL OTHER STATES. OTHER STATES, SHE SAID, WOULD BE INTERESTED IN MONITORING ADHERENCE TO THE YIELD THRESHOLD AND WOULD WISH TO CONTRIBUTE THEIR MEASUREMENTS TO OBSERVATIONS MADE BY THE TWO PARTIES.

CONTRIBUTIONS BY THESE STATES WOULD MATERIALLY ASSIST
TASK OF VERIFICATION, BUT THIS WOULD REQUIRE ACCESS TO
DATA ON TEST SITES AND EXPLOSIONS. IT WOULD THEREFORE
BE POLITICALLY AND TECHNICALLY APPROPRIATE, SHE SAID,
TO MAKE SUCH DATA AVAILABLE AND TO POOL ALL OBSERVATIONS
ON EVENTS. SINCE IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS WAS
INTENDED IN TREATY AND ITS PROTOCOL, SWEDISH DEL WOULD
WELCOME STATEMENT BY CO-CHAIRMAN ON THIS MATTER.

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ACTION ACDA-19

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7. PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. REFERRING TO UNWRITTEN US-USSR UNDERSTANDING THAT SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON PNE MONITORING WOULD PROVIDE FOR PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS, MRS. THORSSON HOPED THIS WOULD MEAN NOT MERELY BILATERAL BUT INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION. SHE SAID THAT PROCEDURES FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION OF PNE'S IN CONTEXT OF ARTICLE V OF NPT, ALREADY FORMULATED BY IAEA IN COOPERATIONS WITH SEVERAL STATES, COULD BE SUITABLE STARTING POINT FOR WORKING OUT PROCEDURES FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION OF PNE'S ON TERRITORIES OF TWO SUPERPOWERS. ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION OF PNE'S--NOT ONLY PNE SERVICES IN CONTEXT OF ARTICLE V BUT ALSO PNE'S CARRIED OUT BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS POWERS FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES--WOULD CONSIDERABLE EASE TASK OF ARRANGING INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS CONDUCTED BY COUNTRIES STILL OUTSIDE NPT. THORSSON ALSO STATED THAT AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON PNE'S WAS NEEDED IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE V OF TREATY. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE PROPER TASK OF CCD. UNDER SUCH AN AGREEMENT, TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY, ECONOMIC, HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECTS SHOULD BE EVALUATED BY IAEA, WHILE OVERALL ADVISABILITY OF PROJECT SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY A POLITICAL INTERNATIONAL BODY.

8. SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM. MRS. THORSSON INDICATED THAT A NEW APPROACH TO PROBLEM OF CONTROL, ONE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN SYSTEM PRESCRIBED IN ARTICLE III OF TREATY, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO EXTEND PRESENT SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, WHICH CAN DETECT BUT NOT PREVENT ANY MISUSE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE ALSO SYSTEM FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL WHERE BY IAEA WOULD STOCKPILE ALL EXCESS MATERIAL. ONE COULD ALSO CONSIDER IAEA OWNERSHIP OF ALL NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN SAME MANNER AS EURATOM "OWNS" ALL NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN COMMUNITY, WHAT SWEDISH DEL HAD IN MIND, SHE SAID,

WAS INTENATINALIZATION OF MANAGEMENT OF THE MATERIAL
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9. AMB ROSHCIN (USSR) HELD THAT WESTERN STATES WERE NOT YET PREPARED TO GET DOWN TO PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSAL FOR THE COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. RECALLING REFERENCE TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN US-SOVIET SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE, ROSHCIN SAID THAT INTENTIN BY US AND USSR TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN SOLUTION OF PROBLEM OF BANNING CW WAS SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD NOT FAIL TO GALVANIZE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION OF THIS PROBLEM. WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE IV OF JAPANESE DRAFT CONVENTION ON CW (WHICH PROVIDES FOR TEMPORARY EXEMPTIONS FROM SCOPE OF AGREEMENT), HE SAID THAT STATES WHOSE ATTITUDES WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ARTICLE IV HAD NOT YET MADE KNOWN THEIR VIEWS ON SCOPE OF PROHIBITION. NO AGREEMENT ON CW COULD BE REACHED UNLESS WESTERN COUNTRIES MADE NECESSARY POLITICAL DECISION CONCERNING SCOPE. SOVIET UNION, ROSHCIN STATED, BELIEVED THERE SHOULD NOT BE DIFFERENT OBLIGATIONS FOR PARTIES WITH RESPECT TO SCOPE. ACCEPTANCE BY SOME PARTICIPANTS OF COMPREHENSIVE BAN, WHILE OTHERS TOOK EXCEPTIONS FROM PROHIBITION, WOULD CONTRADICT PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY.

10. TURNING TO VERIFICATION, ROSHCIN REITERATED MANY OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY SOVIET EXPERT IN INFORMAL CW MEETINGS (GENEVA 4720.) INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF CW PROHIBITION, HE SAID, WOULD BE "PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT." PRESENCE OF FOREIGN OBSERVERS DURING DESTRUCTION OF STOCKPILES COULD RESULT IN DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS AND COULD LEAD TO PROLIFERATION OF LETHAL CHEMICAL MEANS OF WARFARE. THIS IDEA, ROSHCIN CLAIMED, WAS "CONFIRMED" BY DISCUSSIONS AMONG EXPERTS DURING THE INFORMAL MEETINGS. SOLUTION TO PROBLEM OF CONTROL SHOULD BE FOUND BY USING NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION COMPLEMENTED BY CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES. IN CONCLUSION, ROSHCIN TOOK NOTE OF POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION MADE BY EXPERTS IN INFORMAL MEETINGS, BUT STATED THAT, WITHOUT POLITICAL DECISIONS BY STATES, EFFORTS OF SCIENTISTS WOULD NOT ADVANCE CONSIDERATION OF PROBLEM.

11. AMB MISHRA (INDIA) TOOK THE FLOOR TO MAKE BRIEF
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REPLY TO SWEDISH STATEMENT. HE THANKED SWEDISH DEL FOR
TAKING NOTE OF INDIAN ASSURANCES RE PEACEFUL PURPOSES,
BUT INDICATED HE COULD NOT ACCEPT SWEDISH PERSPECTIVE
ON PNE'S. HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO RETURN TO SUBJECT IN
INTERVENTION LATER IN CCD SESSION. DALE

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